Reality of delisting North Korea

It may be premature to discuss the results of the recent six-party talks at this stage. One reason for that is that all observers agree that North Korea's nuclear report is not complete. No consensus has been reached on a method of verifying the credibility of the report.

Nevertheless, whether the United States will remove that country from its list of state sponsors of terrorism will not be known until Aug. 11.

Another reason is that outsiders cannot predict the results of a reinvestigation of the abduction issue, which North Korea has promised Japan. If the abduction issue makes major progress, it would change the evaluation of the U.S. decision to remove the North from its terror-sponsoring list.

I have formed my own conclusions about North Korea's diplomacy by observing the talks between the U.S. and North Korea since 1994. North Korea has the capability of negotiating on piecemeal terms and implementing agreements from such negotiations.

As a result of the talks in 1994, the nation suspended operations at its nuclear facilities in Yongbyon in return for receiving 500,000 tons of heavy oil annually and construction of light-water nuclear reactors. It properly abided by this pledge for six years. In the 1999 talks, it pledged to put on hold the launching of Taepodong missiles in return for a resumption of humanitarian aid, and fulfilled that pledge.

This shows that North Korea can make a piecemeal deal in return for economic aid, assuming that the condition is to place a temporary moratorium on the use of nuclear facilities or the launching of missiles, instead of abandoning them completely. However, at the very least it is still unknown whether North Korea is ready to make permanent deals instead of just piecemeal concessions.

This time the U.S. has been able to accomplish the disabling of Yongbyon facilities through the U.S.-North Korea deal. I heard that the point of contention at the talks was whether North Korea would agree to disable its nuclear facilities to the degree that would require a year for it to resume operations.

U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice is now using the expression "disabling for the purpose of abandonment." Complete denuclearization is to come far in the future. We can only assume that the reality in North Korea has not changed much.

If that's the case, the concession made by North Korea would be to disable its nuclear facilities to a degree that would still enable it to restart them in about one year. Achieving that one goal could have been possible with just the offer to lift the freeze on North Korea's bank account at Banco Delta Asia, particularly when the North desperately needed to break the heavy sanctions imposed by the U.S. and Japan as a result of its nuclear test.

Moreover, only rescindable economic benefits were in fact provided in the 1994 and 1999 talks. This time, however, the U.S. negotiator paid a higher price inasmuch as he shelved various suspicions about North Korea, such as its role in money counterfeiting.

There is only one way to justify such a seemingly excessive concession on the part of the U.S.: to indicate that the disabling of the Yongbyon facility is the first step toward total elimination of the North's nuclear programs, as the U.S. State Department has explained.

This is where my view differs from that of the State Department. I am highly skeptical of the possibility that North Korea, which in effect declared with its nuclear test in 2006 that it is now a de facto nuclear power, will abandon such weapons. I harbor doubts about repeatedly making concessions in the hope that North Korea will eventually scrap all its nuclear weapons.

The U.S. has successively offered concessions that North Korea coveted, including unfreezing its account at Banco Delta Asia, delisting the North from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism, and not applying the Trading with the Enemy Act to it anymore.

What else is left to the U.S. as a bargaining chip that North Korea might consider valuable enough to completely abandon its nuclear programs for? Will North Korea appreciate concessions without substance, such as the promise of a peace treaty or a security guarantee?

What should be done if North Korea never abandons its nuclear programs? One answer might be to continue to call that nation a part of the "axis of evil" or "outpost for tyranny" by sticking to the Bush administration's policy and wait for the North to collapse.

Or, carrots and sticks could be used to a maximum extent. It appears that the harsh response by Japan and the U.S. to its nuclear test in 2006 appears to have dealt a significant blow to North Korea. What would have happened if the sanctions had continued for a few more years? Doubt still remains that the U.S. might have prematurely tried to reap the benefit of the sanctions without consultations with its allies.

If that's the case, the only available way would be to continue strengthening sanctions while crafting a realistic military response, taking into account North Korea's possession of nuclear arms.

It is a glaring fact that the six-party talks this time — in effect, U.S.-China talks and U.S.-North Korea talks — lacked sufficient prior consultations among U.S. allies. If the forum of the six-party talks is to be continued, this is a serious challenge to deal with.

North Korea's complete abandonment of its nuclear weapons is the minimum condition for making the six-party talks a permanent forum. It is grotesque to include North Korea, as a de facto nuclear nation, among the members this forum.