Monday, Feb. 19, 2007

By YOSHIO OKAWARA

Special to The Japan Times

Since coming to power four months ago, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe has successfully mended fences with China and South Korea, reinforced diplomatic and economic foundations in Europe, and built bridges in Southeast Asia. But he has not visited his closest ally, U.S. President George W. Bush, although Abe met Bush for the first time as prime minister on the sidelines of an Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum meeting in Hanoi in November.

Abe's visit to Washington had been given less priority not to slight relations with the United States, but probably because the close ties with his ally across the Pacific were judged to be in good condition.

Although Abe is widely expected to travel to Washington in early May during Japan's "Golden Week" holidays, the visit may look merely routine. He should visit Washington at the earliest possible date, especially in light of the fact that Japan-U.S. relations have become somewhat awkward, with some U.S. administration officials becoming a little skeptical of Japan's diplomatic focus, and two key ministers of Abe's Cabinet criticizing Washington's Iraq policy at the very time when the Bush administration wants support most.

Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao is scheduled to visit Japan from April 11 to 15. The Japanese as well as the foreign media will likely play up this occasion, making the now touted early May U.S. visit look stale and less impressive. To avoid such a scenario, Abe should meet Bush in early April in Washington immediately after the Diet passes the 2007 budget.

U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney will make an official visit to Japan on Tuesday through Thursday, with the apparent aim of reaffirming Japan's continued support for the Bush-Cheney Iraq policy and shoring up the alliance between the two nations. After Tokyo, Cheney will then visit Australia, another U.S. ally, for the same purpose.

Soon after taking office in September, Abe traveled to Beijing and then Seoul, breaking the impasse in Japan's East Asian diplomacy at a time when the international community was being pressed to address Asian issues, including the proliferation of North Korea's weapons of mass destruction. The U.S. welcomed Abe's initial move.

Abe attended a series of Asian summits on Cebu island, the Philippines, in mid-January. The summits involved the leaders of Japan and the 10 members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; ASEAN Plus Three (Japan, China and South Korea); and ASEAN Plus Six (the Three plus India, Australia and New Zealand), which compose the East Asia Summit.

Although the Cebu meetings contributed to promoting a sense of Asian solidarity and are significant in terms of addressing the long-term objective of the East Asia Community, perhaps more conspicuous was the absence of any U.S. representation at all, causing concern among U.S. officials that Asia might proceed with concrete steps without U.S. participation or representation, and that Japan was shifting its foreign-policy axis toward Asia. The fact that Russian President Vladimir Putin was present at the first East Asia Summit in December 2005 with observer status was also cause for concern.

In a late January speech, Defense Minister Fumio Kyuma criticized U.S. policy on Iraq. He also criticized the handling of plans that have been agreed upon between the two governments of Japan and the U.S. concerning the relocation of the Futenma U.S. Marine Air Station in Ginowan, Okinawa Prefecture, in connection with the overall plan of the realignment of U.S. forces in Japan.

In addition Kyuma made remarks that paid too much respect to the sentiments of local Okinawa residents regardless of the agreement, saying in a speech that the plans cannot be implemented unless the Okinawa governor says "yes" and that the U.S. does not understand (the importance) of spadework.

More recently, Foreign Minister Taro Aso took aim at U.S. policy in Iraq, saying that American actions following the initial fighting in 2003 have been "immature."

In such circumstances, the media reported that Japan and the U.S. have been unable to set schedules for a meeting of the Japan-U.S. Security Consultative Committee or the two-plus-two meeting of their foreign and defense ministers. The last two-plus-two was held in Washington in May 2006, which, according to a U.S. State Department spokesman, "came up with a good compromise . . . and we are ready to follow through on our end of the bargain. I expect the Japanese are as well."

As things stand, one cannot help but think that the Japan-U.S. alliance is not as close and as strong as it was during the Koizumi-Bush era.

The American Chamber of Commerce in Japan recently issued a white paper titled "Working Together, Winning Together." The ACCJ, saying the bilateral relationship is the most favorable in its history, called for Japan and the U.S. to restructure the U.S.-Japan Economic Partnership for Growth by establishing a new bilateral mechanism, including a Cabinet-level Japan-U.S. Ministerial Forum to discuss key bilateral, regional and global issues facing the two economies.

It is interesting that the ACCJ, which had been at the forefront in criticizing Japan for market protectionism when trade friction was rampant, has come up with such accommodating proposals advocating "symbiosis or mutualism." With regard to the proposed integration of the Japanese and U.S. economies, the Japan-U.S. Economic Council has been talking about concluding a free trade agreement, but many problems exist. Since the U.S. and South Korea are negotiating an FTA. Japan should closely study the development of the talks and, taking advantage of the study, it should prepare for negotiations with the U.S. at some future date.

It is also advisable to delve into what led to the ending of the Japan-U.S. Ministerial Meeting, which was annually held from 1961 to 1972, because the study can provide useful lessons for the future. The ACCJ has proposed the creation of some 20 sectoral working committees. Though the creation itself may be desirable, too many committees will not work effectively.

We are very happy to state that no trade friction as such exists at present, but U.S. wariness of competition with Japan, including in the auto sector, is widespread. Moreover, Washington is not satisfied that U.S. beef exports to Japan remain at low levels even though the BSE problem has technically, and diplomatically, been settled. We should be aware of these potential problems.

Bush has proposed to Congress a bill to extend the Trade Promotion Authority, which will end in July -- a step to get the World Trade Organization's Doha round of talks moving, which have been stalled primarily over agricultural subsidies. Japan must be prepared for difficult decisions should the Doha round make a breakthrough as a result of intensified negotiations among the U.S., the European Union and other major parties concerned.

The U.S. midterm elections in November resulted in the Democratic Party winning control of both houses of Congress for the first time in 12 years. The Republican Party's defeat was due to growing criticism of the Iraq war.

As a last-gasp push to get his country and his administration out of the Iraq quagmire, Bush called for a "surge" in combat troops and proposed sending a further 22,000 to Iraq. Less than 24 hours later, the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee came out against sending more troops.

Facing growingly adverse situations in Iraq, it is evident he needs strong support from his allies -- particularly Britain, Australia and Japan.

Now that the six-party talks held in Beijing have finally produced an agreement on measures to be taken by North Korea and other parties in the initial stage, the Bush administration may feel that at least for a while the U.S. can afford to focus its energy more on Iraq and Iran.

There was a newspaper report from Pyongyang suggesting that North Korea intends to consummate the deal with the U.S. during the Bush administration. This is very interesting because North Korea has been suspected for some time of playing for time, perhaps in anticipation of a Democratic victory in the U.S. presidential election in November 2008. The 1994 Agreed Framework, a rather favorable deal for North Korea, which was concluded by the Clinton administration, might have been in their mind.

We should watch closely to ensure that North Korea faithfully implements the measures as agreed upon in Beijing.

Yoshio Okawara, a former Japanese ambassador to the United States, is president of the Institute for International Policy Studies.

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